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Abstract 
The 2012 Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP system 
recommended that several changes be made to the way in which future parliaments are 
elected in New Zealand.  The lack of legislative response to the recommendations highlighted 
an issue inherent in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements - that changes to electoral 
rules are designed and enacted by politicians, and there is no mechanism through which 
citizens can initiate or meaningfully engage with electoral reform processes.  This paper looks 
at whether there is a better way that such proposals for electoral rule changes could be 
managed, proposing the use of ‘citizen initiated’ Citizens’ Assemblies on Electoral Reform. 
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I  Introduction 
 
This report is about our democracy.  It is about the way New Zealanders give their consent to 
the exercise by Parliament and the Government of great public power. 
      - The Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, 1986
1
 
 
The way in which elections operate “has inevitable consequences for the composition, powers 
and policy priorities of government.”
2
  Because of those consequences, issues arising around 
the electoral system are of foremost significance to New Zealand’s constitution.   
 
The current New Zealand electoral system, known as Mixed Member Proportional 
Representation (MMP), was introduced through public referendum in 1993.
3
  Since that time 
there has been significant debate about the merits of the system.  As a part of its election 
platform in 2008, the National Party pledged to hold a referendum, asking the public whether 
the MMP system should be retained or should be replaced with another option.
4
  A part of the 
enabling legislation required that, should more than 50 percent of electors choose to retain 
MMP, the Electoral Commission “must commence a review of the Mixed Member 
Proportional representation voting system ... as soon as practicable”.
5
  At the 2011 election, 
57.8 percent of voters in the electoral referendum voted to retain MMP,
6
 thus launching a 
significant independent review of MMP.  The review looked at five issues set out in the 
Electoral Reform Act 2010.
7
   
 
In November 2012, the Electoral Commission released its final report, which recommended  
several changes to the MMP system.
8
  In May 2013 the Government of the day announced 
that none of the recommended changes would be adopted because “there is absolutely no 
consensus ... across parliament” on the form that the improved MMP system should take.
9
 
 
                                                
1
 The Royal Commission on the Electoral System Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, December 
1986) at [1.1]. 
2 Raymond Miller NZ Government and Politics (5th ed., Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2009) at 169. 
3
 At 38. 
4
 At 168. 
5
 Electoral Referendum Act 2010, s 75. 
6 Electoral Commission Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP Voting System (E9, 29 
October 2012) at 6. 
7
 Electoral Referendum Act 2010, s 76. 
8
 Electoral Commission, above n 6, at 5. 
9 Judith Collins “MMP Changes Impossible Without Agreement” 15 May 2013 Beehive 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nz>. 
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The lack of legislative response to the Electoral Commission’s report highlights an inherent 
constitutional problem.  Under the current constitutional arrangements, neither the 
Government nor Parliament were legally obliged to take any action in response to the 
recommendations.  In all situations, reform of electoral rules and processes are left in the 
hands of those who are elected by the rules and processes in question.  Under this 
arrangement, politicians are heavily involved in both the design and implementation of any 
changes to electoral rules.  This research paper explores this problem in light of the changes 
recommended by the Electoral Commission.  Through examination of the nature of the 
recommendations, and the impact the changes could have on each of New Zealand’s main 
political parties, it is clear that partisan self interest has coloured the responses from across 
Parliament.   
 
Ultimately, this paper asks whether there is a better way that such proposals for electoral rule 
changes could be managed.  In short, I conclude that a sea change is required to address the 
problematic nature of New Zealand’s electoral reform processes. Drawing on the discussions 
of constitutional lawyers and theorists in New Zealand and around the world on electoral 
reform processes, democratic engagement, and democratic legitimacy, the solution proposed 
here is to engage ‘citizens’ assemblies’ on electoral reform - as has been done with some 
success in Canada and the Netherlands - including a mechanism that allows such an assembly 
to be ‘citizen initiated’. 
 
II The Electoral Commission’s Report 
 
A The Review 
 
The Electoral Commission’s review was an independent inquiry into whether changes to the 
MMP voting system were necessary or desirable.
10
  It was conducted by the Electoral 
Commission, whose role includes considering and reporting “on electoral matters referred to 
it by the Minister of Justice or House of Representatives” and making “any recommendations 
for changes to the system to the Minister of Justice”.
11
 The Commission, led by Sir Hugh 
Williams, Jane Huria and Robert Peden, carried out the review with the help of a number of 
expert submissions, and with around 6000 public submissions across two rounds of public 
                                                
10 Electoral Commission, above n 6, at 2. 
11
 Electoral Referendum Act 2010, ss 75(2)(a) and 75(2)(b). 
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consultation.
12
  This extensive consultation firstl gave members of the public the chance to 
answer open-ended questions about how MMP should look, and then gave them a further 
chance to comment specifically on proposed recommendations in the months leading up to 
the report being finalised.
13
 The review was a significant project for the Electoral 
Commission.  The process was lengthy, conducted over almost a year, and cost the taxpayer 
around 1.3 million dollars.
14
  
 
As outlined in the final report, the independent review of the MMP system looked primarily at 
four main issues:
15
 
 
1. The thresholds for gaining entry into Parliament, which are currently set at either 5 
percent of the party vote, or one electorate seat; 
2. The ratio of electorate to list seats in Parliament, and the effect that this has on 
proportionality; 
3. Dual candidacy, where those seeking election can do so by both contesting an 
electorate and being on a party list; and 
4. The order of candidates on party lists, and whether the lists should be open or 
closed. 
 
The Commission also had scope within the legislation to look at “any other issues referred to 
the Commissioner by the Minister of Justice or Parliament”, but no other matters were 
referred during the process.
16
   
 
B The Recommendations 
 
The Electoral Commission’s report recommended that the five percent party vote threshold 
should be lowered to four percent (and should be reviewed every three elections), and the one 
electorate seat threshold should be abolished.
17
  It also expressed some concern about the 
representativeness and proportionality of parliament, recommending that a 60:40 ratio of 
                                                
12
 Electoral Commission, above n 6, at 7. 
13 See generally Andrew Geddis “Stop Wasting our Time” (14 May 2013) Pundit <http://pundit.co.nz>; Electoral 
Commission, above n 6, at 7. 
14
 Electoral Commission, above n 6, at 7. 
15
 At 6. 
16 At 6. 
17
 Electoral Referendum Act 2010, s 76(f). 
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electorate to list seats would be the optimum level to maintain a diverse, representative and 
proportionate parliament.
18
 
 
The report envisaged that, should Parliament agree with the recommendations, the proposed 
changes would be enacted in time to be in place for the 2014 general election.
19
  It didn’t 
consider that the changes would “fundamentally alter” the voting system, so further envisaged 
that they could be passed through parliament without a referendum.
20
 
 
III The Response from the Government and Parliament 
 
A The Response 
 
As previously outlined, the Government announced that the changes recommended by the 
Electoral Commission could not be implemented, as there was no consensus across 
Parliament.
21
  According to that announcement, Labour and the Greens would be the only 
parties in the House prepared to support the package of recommendations as a whole.
22
  
National, the Māori Party and ACT all support retaining the status quo.
23
  The other parties in 
the House - Mana, United Future and NZ First - would support some of the recommendations, 
but not others.
24
 The government announcement used this information to demonstrate the 
breadth of political opinion on the changes proposed. 
 
B Consensus and Electoral Rules 
 
Whether or not such a consensus across Parliament is required for making changes to 
electoral rules and processes is a question that lacks a clear answer.  General agreement across 
the House of Representatives has been seen on a number of important constitutional and 
electoral issues - one example being the vote to introduce the Constitution Act 1986, which 
was supported by both the Labour and National parties - but certainly has not been evidenced 
for all changes to constitutional and electoral rules in recent political history.   
 
                                                
18
 Electoral Commission, above n 6, at 6. 
19 At 10. 
20
 At 10. 
21
 Judith Collins, above n 9. 
22
 Judith Collins, above n 9. 
23 Judith Collins, above n 9. 
24
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Under New Zealand’s constitution Parliament enjoys untrammelled sovereignty to pass any 
law whatsoever.
25
  Legally, there are no limitations on its power to make laws, and the 
changes could certainly have been passed through the House had the National Party supported 
the package.  It has been suggested, however, that a convention exists that requires consensus 
for making constitutional changes, including changes to electoral rules.
26
  Conventions are a 
“non-legal” source of New Zealand’s constitution.
27
  They are described as “rules of political 
obligation that are distinguished from ordinary political usage in two ways: they evoke a 
sense of obligation that the actors are bound by a rule of conduct, and they serve a necessary 
constitutional purpose.”
28
  
 
Sir Ivor Jennings developed a test for determining whether a convention exists.
29
  The first 
step of that test is to ask whether there are any precedents for such a rule.
30
  The second step 
is to ask whether the actors in the precedents believed they were bound by the rule.
31
  The 
third step is to consider whether there is a constitutional reason for the rule.
32
 Thus, 
determining whether a convention requiring a consensus on constitutional matters exists or is 
at least developing requires examination of a wide range of past proposals for constitutional, 
and in this context electoral rule, changes.   
 
A number of important changes to the constitution and electoral rules have been made with 
consensus, as well as several proposals aborted due to a lack of consensus.  Along with the 
Constitution Act 1986, an example is the Bill of Rights Act 1990.  The Act was initially 
envisaged as entrenched and supreme legislation,
33
 but was passed as ordinary legislation as 
there was no consensus - across Parliament and across the submissions to the Select 
Committee - on the entrenchment provision.
34
  Matthew Palmer highlights, however, that 
other important changes were made without consensus.  He writes that there have been a 
number of changes, some of them quite significant, that “slip through the system... unheralded 
and unnoticed.”
35
  Examples include the Supreme Court Act 2003, which abolished the right 
                                                
25
 Constitution Act 1986, s 15. 
26
 See The Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 1 at [7.33]. 
27 Joseph PA, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers, 2001) at 34. 
28
 At 34. 
29
 Sir Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5
th
 ed, University of London Press, 1959) at 136. 
30
 At 136.  
31 At 136. 
32
 At 136. 
33
 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper” [1984-1985] 1 AJHR A6 at pp 9-16 and 
53. 
34 See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; (21 August 1990) 510 NZPD 3761. 
35
 Matthew Palmer “New Zealand Constitutional Culture” (2007) 22 NZULR 565 at 594. 
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of appeal to the Privy Council. 
36
  That Act was passed into law without consensus.
37
  It was 
pushed through Parliament by Hon Margaret Wilson and the Labour Government, in the face 
of opposition from the National Party, some minor parties, and across the business and legal 
communities.
38
   
 
Significant changes to electoral rules have also been made both with and without consensus.  
Recently, the Electoral (Finance Reform and Advanced Voting) Amendment Act 2010 passed 
into legislation with 116 ‘aye’ votes - the legislation was virtually unanimously supported 
across Parliament.
39
  Likewise, the major overhaul of the electoral system in 1993 was 
implemented through referendum support, rather than an ordinary parliamentary majority,
40
 
and the Electoral Referendum Act 2010, which set up the 2011 referendum on the electoral 
system was passed with unanimous support.
41
  Notably, the parliamentary debates on each of 
these pieces of legislation were strongly focused on the need for consensus, and celebrated 
that it had been achieved.  Simon Power highlighted that “electoral law should be based on a 
broad consensus so that the rules are enduring and certain across elections”.
42
 Conversely, 
however, other important electoral rule changes have been passed without recourse to a 
consensus across parliament.  The Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) 
Amendment Act 2010 was passed by a small majority only days before the Electoral (Finance 
Reform and Advanced Voting) Amendment Act 2010 and the Electoral Referendum Act 
2010.
43
  Again, consensus was brought up in parliamentary debates, but only by those in 
opposition to the Bill.
44
  Earlier changes to electoral rules followed the same course, including 
the Electoral Finance Act 2007, the Electoral (Vacancies) Amendment Act 2004, changes to 
Māori seats, and amendments to broadcasting and advertising rules.
45
 
 
Applying Jennings’ test, there does appear to be some precedents for the rule that consensus is 
required when making constitutional law changes, including changes to electoral rules, as 
well as indications from parliamentary debates that the actors considered themselves to be 
bound by that requirement.  However, there exists clear instances where Parliament hasn’t 
                                                
36
 (14 October 2003) 612 NZPD 9096. 
37
 (14 October 2003) 612 NZPD 9096. 
38 Raymond Miller, above n 2, at 93. 
39
 (15 December 2010) 669 NZPD 16441. 
40
 Raymond Miller, above n 2, at 93. 
41
 (15 December 2010) 669 NZPD 16441; Simon Power “Bill for referendum on voting systems passed 
unanimously” (15 December 2010) New Zealand Government <http://beehive.govt.nz>. 
42
 (15 December 2010) 669 NZPD 16441. 
43
 (8 December 2010) 669 NZPD 15961. 
44
 (8 December 2010) 669 NZPD 15961. 
45 (18 December 2007) 644 NZPD 14038; (1 December 2004) 622 NZPD 17332; Graeme Edgeler “On 
Consensus” (15 May 2013) Legal Beagle <http://www.publicaddress.net>. 
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considered itself bound by the precedents, and have made significant changes without 
consensus. 
 
In light of the fact that legislative history shows that partisan electoral law changes have been 
made on a number of occasions, the Government’s position - that the Electoral Commission’s 
recommendations could not be implemented without consensus - appears somewhat artificial.  
Despite having passed the enabling legislation, the currently governing National Party, with 
59 members in the 121 seat Parliament, is itself opposed to the changes proposed in the 2012 
report, and instead supports retaining the status quo.  As this is the case, finding a consensus 
in Parliament would be entirely impossible, when almost half of all MPs would not have 
supported any changes proposed. 
 
IV The Constitutional Implications 
 
A The Issue 
 
Under New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, the recommendations of the Electoral 
Commission could legally be ignored.  However, in the aftermath of the announcement that 
no action would be taken, deep dissatisfaction with the decision was widely expressed.
46
  
Among others, constitutional lawyer Andrew Geddis and political commentator Vernon Sharp 
have expressed concern that a review of such a significant and public nature can be rendered 
“a complete waste of time”.
47
 
 
This situation gives rise to concern about New Zealand’s constitution.  Elections are a 
fundamental part of our elective democracy, but the way in which electoral rules are formed 
and reformed seems inherently problematic.  In a recent political science journal, Janine 
Hayward highlighted the importance of having a process of electoral reform that operated 
with integrity, rather than struggles to balance partisan self-interest.
48
 The issue in New 
Zealand is that such a process does not currently appear to exist in any effective form.     
 
                                                
46
 See Andrew Geddis, above n 13; Vernon Sharp “MMP Proposals need Referendum” (16 May 2013) Stuff 
<http://www.stuff.co.nz>; Kate Chapman “Government’s MMP review response slammed” (15 May 2013) Stuff 
Politics <http://www.stuff.co.nz>; Lianne Dalziel “Minister’s response to MMP review a travesty (14 May 
2013) Labour Party <http://www.labour.org.nz>. 
47
 Andrew Geddis, above n 13; see also Vernon Sharp, above n 46. 
48 Janine Hayward “Citizens Assemblies and Policy Reform in New Zealand” (2013) 9(2) Policy Quarterly 70 at 
71. 
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B Partisan self interest 
 
Electoral reform has always been difficult to implement, because the way in which political 
parties are elected so clearly and directly affects those who make the laws - parliamentarians.  
Political scientists and constitutional lawyers generally agree that self interest is a key 
determinant in parties’ attitudes to electoral reform.
49
  The conclusion of Bowler et al, in a 
study that looked at proposals for electoral change in Australia, Germany and the Netherlands 
as well as in New Zealand, was that, while other factors are at play, “rational self interest is a 
major feature” in determining political actors attitudes toward electoral change.
50
  Likewise, 
Pilet and Bol write that the overwhelming academic view is that “parties are first and 
foremost strategic players which evaluate any change in the electoral system with regard to its 
impact on the balance of power between and within parties,”
51
 and elsewhere articulate that 
there is general consensus that parties are driven by “their vested interest”.
52
  Essentially, in 
New Zealand as well as around the world, the assumption is that political parties will 
generally favour the manner of electing parliament that is most likely to favour their chances 
of success in upcoming elections.  In a system such as MMP, where electoral ‘success’ does 
not rest only on a specific party’s result, but also on the results of other parties, this self 
interest problem may be amplified.  Parties within the system will position themselves in a 
way that benefits both themselves and potential governing partners, in order to best ensure a 
positive result come election time.   
 
This self interested approach to electoral reform is problematic because “the laws governing 
the conduct [of elections] are crucially important”
53
 and allowing self interest to shape the 
way in which they develop can have implications for the operation of democracy itself.  The 
changes recommended by the Electoral Commission would have effected the make-up of past 
parliaments, and would also likely impact on upcoming elections. The significant role of self 
interest of political parties can be demonstrated through analysis of each of the thresholds 
                                                
49
 See Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp “Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions: Self-
interest, Values or Ideology?” (2006) 68:2 Journal of Politics 434; Jean-Benoit Pilet & Damien Bol “Party 
Preferences and Electoral Reform: How Time in Government Affects the Likelihood of Supporting Electoral 
Change” (2013) 34/3 West European Politics 568, at 568; Carles Boix “Setting the Rules of the Game: The 
Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies” (1999) 93:3 American Political Science Review 609; 
and Kenneth Sheppsle “A Comment on Insitutional Change” (2001) 13 Journal of Theoretical Politics 321. 
50
 Shaun Bowler et al, above n 49, at 434. 
51
 Jean-Benoit Pilet & Damien Bol, above n 49, at 568. 
52
 At 569. 
53 Alan McRobie “The Electoral System” in Phillip Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution (Brookers Ltd, 
Wellington, 1995). 
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recommended to be changed.  This analysis begins to demonstrate the constitutional problem 
that the response to the Electoral Commission’s review has highlighted. 
 
(a) The party vote threshold 
 
The party vote threshold requires parties to reach that threshold before they can gain entry 
into parliament.  Under the status quo, if a party does not reach five percent of the nationwide 
party vote, they will not be represented in the House at all (except through the one electorate 
seat exception).  The threshold exists to ensure that the House of Representatives is not 
effected by an “undue proliferation of very small parties in Parliament”.
54
  It was imported 
directly from the German system, which also operates with a five percent party vote 
threshold.
55
  As outlined by the Electoral Commission’s Report on MMP, the threshold was 
designed to balance the main objectives of MMP: (1) proportionality, and (2) effective 
parliaments and stable government.
56
   The Electoral Commission considered that the five 
percent threshold currently in place is “higher than it needs to be to strike the right balance” 
between the two objectives, and thus recommended lowering it to four percent.
57
 
 
A lower party vote threshold of four percent would have effected the make up of parliament 
in several MMP elections.  There have been three instances where parties have commanded 
between four and five percent of the party vote.
58
  One of these instances was the 2008 
Election, in which New Zealand First received 4.1% of the party vote, and thus did not return 
to parliament.
59
  In that case, if the threshold had been four percent rather than five they 
would have been represented in parliament with five MPs. 
 
The party vote threshold only directly effects the minor parties in parliament.  National and 
Labour, and increasingly the Green Party, consistently enjoy support well above five percent, 
and are thus not faced with the prospect of falling short of any threshold for entry into 
parliament.  Smaller parties currently represented in Parliament on the other hand, do face that 
prospect.  Indirectly, however, the threshold also effects the larger parties, as all MMP 
elections thus far have resulted in multi-party governing arrangements.  According to data 
collected and released through the Beehive, a lower threshold is supported by the Labour 
                                                
54 Electoral Commission, above n 6, at 7. 
55
 Bundewahlgesetz (Federal Election Law) 1956 (Germany), Art 6(6). 
56
 Electoral Commission, above n 6, at 8. 
57
 Electoral Commission, above n 6, at 8. 
58 At 8. 
59
 “2008 General Election: Results of the Official Count” (22 November 2008) 180 New Zealand Gazette 4638. 
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Party, the Green Party, the Māori Party, the Mana Party and the United Future Party.
60
  The 
Labour Party (along with their closely allied Green Party colleagues) would be the most likely 
to benefit from smaller parties gaining more seats in Parliament as the incumbent Government 
are themselves polling well and will almost certainly be the largest party in the next 
parliament, but appear to have few options in terms of governing partners.
61
 
 
Unusually (and in stark contradiction to the ordinary hypothesis regarding self interest and 
electoral laws), the lowering of the threshold is actually opposed by the party that stands to 
gain the most from the threshold.  The New Zealand First Party support retaining the five 
percent threshold despite consistently polling around the five percent mark, and thus being at 
risk of falling below the threshold for entry into parliament, as well as having fallen below at 
previous elections. 
 
 (c) The one electorate seat exception 
 
The one electorate seat exception to the party vote threshold - designed to make it easier for 
minor parties to gain entry into parliament where their supported is heavily concentrated in an 
area, region or electorate - was also imported from the German Electoral System.
62
  In 
Germany, the exception is three electorate seats.
63
  In the context of a much larger population 
and parliament, the threshold for entry into the Bundestag is designed to allow parties with 
significant regional support to be represented.
64
  The decision to set the threshold at just one 
seat in New Zealand was presumably a response to a much smaller parliament, but the aim of 
the threshold was largely unexplained by the Royal Commission.
65
  In New Zealand, the 
exception has had quite a significant impact on the makeup of parliaments, and has become 
increasingly unpopular.
66
  While in Germany the provision operates to make regional voices 
stronger, in New Zealand it has given rise to “wheeler dealing” and “clever practice” around 
election times.
67
  Sir John Wallace KNZM QC was a chairman of the 1986 Royal 
                                                
60
 Judith Collins, above n 9. 
61 See Colmar Brunton “Current ONE New Colmar Brunton Poll” (25 Aug 2013) Colmar Brunton New Zealand 
<http://www.colmarbrunton.co.nz>. 
62
 Bundewahlgesetz (Federal Election Law) 1956 (Germany), Art 6(6). 
63
 Art 6(6). 
64 See The Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 1, at [2.116]. 
65
 Ryan Malone Rebalancing the Constitution: The Challenge of Government Law-Making under MMP (Institute 
of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2008) at 38. 
66
 Electoral Commission, above n 6, at 8. 
67 John Wallace “Reflections on Constitutional and Other Issues Concerning our Electoral System: The Past and 
the Future” (2002) 33 VUWLR 719, at 735. 
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Commission that recommended adopting the exception as a part of the MMP package.
68
  
After observing the early MMP elections, he notably changed his opinion on the exception 
upon seeing the way in which it had operated in the New Zealand context:
69
 
 
I now incline to the view that the New Zealand voting public is so unhappy and cynical 
about political conduct that anything which can have an aura of clever practice is better 
avoided.  I would, therefore, abolish the provision under which the threshold is waived 
for a party that wins a constituency seat. 
 
Wallace described the operation of the exception as giving rise to arrangements where “Party 
A withdraws its candidate ... in order to encourage voters who would otherwise have given 
their electorate vote to Party A to give their vote to Party B”.
70
  This type of arrangement has 
occurred between potential coalition partners, and has been seen to manipulate voter 
behaviour.  Often, voters cast their vote strategically rather than voting for their preferred 
candidate in their electorate, thus voting for Party B, rather than their first choice, Party A.
71
  
Bowler et al write that voters recognise that their vote can influence “the partisan composition 
of parliament” if their minor party wins an electorate seat and passes the threshold, or wins 
more electorate seats than its share of the party vote would allocate them.
72
 
 
In terms of the National Party, there is certainly an argument that removing the exception 
would impact their position going into the 2014 Election.  The incumbent Government is led 
by the National Party, which is represented by 59 Members of Parliament.  Its ability to 
govern is secured by ‘Confidence and Supply Agreements’ with the single member ACT 
Party, the three member Māori Party, and the single member United Future Party.
73
  This 
arrangement is synonymous with the MMP system, under which no party has been able to 
govern without coalition or support partners.  None of these support partners were directly 
impacted by any threshold or coat-tailing provisions at the 2011 election.  Each is represented 
in Parliament only by the members who won their electorates.  However, changes to those 
rules may impact the positions of National and each of their governing partners looking 
                                                
68 The Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 1, at [2.116]. 
69
 John Wallace, above n 67, at 736. 
70
 John Wallace, above n 67, at 735. 
71
 Shaun Bowler et al, above n 49, at 6. 
72 At 6. 
73
 See generally Confidence and Supply Agreement with Act New Zealand (5 December 2011) New Zealand 
Parliament <www.parliament.govt.nz>; Relationship Accord and Confidence and Supply Agreement with the 
Māori Party (11 December 2011) New Zealand Parliament <www.parliament.govt.nz>; Confidence and Support 
Agreement with United Future New Zealand (5 December 2011), New Zealand Parliament 
<www.parliament.govt.nz>. 
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forward, especially as it may ultimately discourage voters from voting for the minor parties at 
all.  Without the opportunity to bring other members in at future elections, it is likely that 
voters would choose to vote for their preferred candidate, thus resulting in significant blows 
to the ACT Party and the United Future Party.   As National’s governing parties, such a blow 
is against the political interests of National, and of ACT and United Future.  This is reflected 
in each party’s position on the recommended changes; National, ACT and United Future all 
support a retention of the status quo.
74
  Likewise, each of the parties in opposition support the 
abolition of the exception, arguably as a direct consequence of their view that the exception 
works in the current Government’s favour.
75
 
 
The political survival of the ACT Party, whose support has steadily declined over recent 
elections, is dependant on the one electorate seat threshold.  The last election in which the 
party reached the five percent party vote threshold was 2002.
76
  As previously discussed, in 
each election since, the ACT Party has been heavily reliant on their “safe” seat in the Epsom 
electorate which has launched them into parliament.
77
  In 2008, the party gained a single 
electorate seat, and a party vote share of 3.65%; this gave them five seats in Parliament.
78
 In 
2011 its share of the party vote dropped significantly, with the party receiving only 1.07% of 
the votes cast nationwide.
79
  Despite a tumultuous previous term in the House, it retained its 
single electorate seat.
80
 The traditionally right-leaning Epsom electorate has been virtually 
uncontested by the National Party in recent elections.  Reports from 2005, 2008 and 2011 
indicate that they have focussed only on gaining the party vote from voters in the area.  The 
Party encouraged voters to support the ACT candidate (in 2005 and 2008, Rodney Hide and 
in 2011, John Banks), so that the one electorate seat exception would be invoked.  This 
encouragement was seen at each election both through the focus of the campaign advertising, 
and also through the infamous “cup of tea”.
81
  The cup of tea “has become a default for New 
Zealand political leaders to send electoral signals”, indicating to voters in strategic electorates 
where their electorate votes would be best placed.
82
  During the 2011 election campaign, 
                                                
74
 Judith Collins, above n 9. 
75
 Judith Collins, above n 9. 
76 Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, Jeffrey Karp & Raymond Miller Voters Veto: The 2002 Election 
and the Consolidation of Minority Power (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2003). 
77
 Adam Bennett “Reading the tea leaves in Epsom” (12 Nov 2011) New Zealand Herald 
<http://nzherald.co.nz>. 
78 New Zealand Gazette, above n 59. 
79
 See “2011 General Election and Referendum on the Electoral System: Results of the Official Count” (8 
December 2011) 190 New Zealand Gazette 5477. 
80
 See New Zealand Gazette, above n 79. 
81 See Adam Bennett , above n 77.  
82
 Adam Bennett, above n 77. 
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National Party leader John Key met with John Banks at an Epsom cafe.
83
  Key stated that “if 
they [Epsom voters] decide to tactically vote and split their vote I wouldn’t at all be 
unhappy”, in a clear indication that an electorate vote for Banks would be a good choice.
84
  
With ACT Party support dwindling nationwide, it seems likely that their political hopes for 
2014 are pinned on similar encouragement being given to Epsom voters in the lead up to that 
election.
85
  United Future has also benefited from the one electorate seat threshold in past 
elections through Party Leader Peter Dunne’s Ohariu seat, and may also suffer the effects of 
the abolition of the threshold. 
 
In the most recent polls, the United Future Party and the ACT Party are polling at around one 
percent.
86
  Each of these polls show the Conservative Party polling at around two percent of 
the party vote, and thus in a stronger position.  Some bloggers and columnists have 
highlighted this position as showing that the Conservative Party could also benefit from 
strategic voting at the 2014 Election.  Tim Watkin wrote in July 2013 that:
87
   
 
Warkworth is the obvious place for Key to have a cup of tea next year ... Epsom has more 
than done its duty and Colin Craig could be manoeuvred into the Rodney seat. 
 
If Colin Craig was to win the Rodney seat through strategic voting by the traditionally 
National-voting electorate, the one electorate seat threshold would allow him to bring in 
several other MPs, and thus provide the support that the National Party needs to command a 
majority in the House. 
 
Viable partners in government (whether coalition partners or through confidence and supply 
agreements) are an extremely important element of the MMP system.  Given that, to lose 
ACT and United Future, as well as the potential for the Conservative Party to enter parliament 
at 2014, would likely be deeply concerning for the National Party. Such a loss could 
significantly impact their ability to form a government.  This concern has certainly been cited 
in the online and news media as a key driver for the incumbent government to ignore the 
recommendations.
88
  On the opposition side, also, partisan self interest is undoubtedly at play.  
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Andrew Geddis, for example, highlights that “part of the reason Labour and the Greens are so 
supportive of the Commission’s recommendations is that they think they will have just this 
effect on National and its allies.”
89
 
 
C Undermining the Democratic Process 
 
The term ‘democracy’ is derived from Greek origins, and literally means “the people rule”.
90
  
In New Zealand, as in other representative democracies, democracy is built upon 
representation of the people - the people give their consent, through elections, for Parliament 
to legislate and the government to govern on their behalf.
91
  Representative democracy, 
however, does not mean that New Zealanders are - or ought to be - satisfied with a system 
where democracy only exists around election time.  While the term democracy eludes a 
concise definition, New Zealand’s constitutional lawyers have attempted to define what it 
means to be democratic in New Zealand. One such definition that seems to encapsulate the 
ever-present nature of democracy is that of Margaret Wilson, who states that, “Political 
decision making is democratic if it enables ‘the people’ to engage and participate in decisions 
that affect them in a meaningful way’ (emphasis added).
92
  
 
The apparent self-interestness at play in terms of the specific proposed changes indicates that 
the democratic process is being undermined, as it renders the people’s engagement and 
participation with the review process wholly un-meaningful.  The scope of the review was 
significant in terms of public consultation and expenditure of resources, and thus should have 
been a meaningful democratic exercise.  Andrew Geddis highlighted the way in which the 
process was run - by “independent, impartial individuals” who received a huge number of 
public submissions on the issues up for review.
93
  They were tasked with coming up with 
recommendations “based upon the best evidence the Commission could get on the issues and 
reflective of the majority sentiments of the thousands of people who took the time and effort” 
to share their opinions.
94
  In light of this, Geddis came to the conclusion that:
95
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Herald <http://www.nzherald.co.nz>; New Zealand Herald “Collins fails Electoral Review Test” (16 May 2013) 
New Zealand Herald <http://www.nzherald.co.nz>; Jon Johansson “National Quiet on MMP Changes” (23 April 
2013) Dominion Post <http://www.stuff.co.nz>. 
89
 Andrew Geddis, above n 13. 
90
 David Held Models of Democracy (Stanford University Press, California, 2006) at 1. 
91 The Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 1, at [1.1]. 
92
 Margaret Wilson “Constitutional Theory Informed by Practice” in Claire Charters and Dean Knight (ed) We 
the People(s): Participation in Governance (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2011) at 183. 
93
 Andrew Geddis, above n 13. 
94 Andrew Geddis, above n 13. 
95
 Andrew Geddis, above n 13. 
17 
 
 
... in terms of assessing both what is the public mood regarding MMP’s various rules, as 
well as what is the range of expert opinion on those rules, the Commission is in a far 
better position than any other body in New Zealand. 
 
This view is particularly persuasive when one considers the nature of the subject up for 
review in light of the self interest issues.  Indeed, Simon Power, the former Minister of Justice 
charged with setting up the referendum and review process, also publicly expressed this 
opinion prior to the recommendations being made.  In a speech to the ‘Reconstituting the 
Constitution Conference‘ in 2010, Power highlighted the Government policy (in terms of 
constitutional and specifically electoral reform) of avoiding “situations where politicians are 
too heavily involved in the design of any changes.”
96
  The speech acknowledged that allowing 
politicians to decide the direction of electoral reform would be akin to “letting panelbeaters 
design intersections.”
97
 
 
D Democratic Legitimacy 
 
Discussions around meaningful citizen engagement in the democratic process across the 
world and in New Zealand stress the importance of ‘democratic legitimacy’, or conversely, of 
minimizing “democratic deficiency”.  Joel Colon-Rios wrote that a constitutional framework 
must provide opportunities for the exercise of constituent power and “for citizens to 
participate in constitutional change” in order to be considered legitimate.
98
  In the New 
Zealand context, he highlighted “obvious problems” in terms of democracy - that 
constitutional changes can only be made through ordinary legislative processes or through the 
development of conventions.
99
  In short, Colon-Rios concluded that New Zealanders lack the 
proper means to exercise their constituent power”,
100
 as under the constitutional framework 
“there is an almost complete identification of ‘parliament’ and ‘people’”.
101
 Colon-Rios writes 
that under unwritten constitutions such as New Zealand’s and Britain’s, “the former appears 
as a constituent assembly in potentially permanent session, and the latter rarely makes an 
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appearance other than voting in regular elections”. 
102
 The problem framed by Colon-Rios 
regarding the New Zealand constitutional framework, and also in a broader context by authors 
such as Andreas Kalyvas and Vernon Bogdanor,
103
 is further amplified in terms of questions 
of electoral reform.  New Zealanders do not have a means of initiating and meaningfully 
participating in changes to electoral rules, especially where partisan self  interest is at play.   
 
The lack of democratic legitimacy in this area is significant, because electoral rules are 
fundamental to the operation of democratic elections, and thus are held as lynchpins of the 
New Zealand constitution.  On the fundamental importance of elections, Janine Hayward 
wrote that: “Under New Zealand’s unwritten and non-entrenched constitution ... the triennial 
election of representatives of the house is arguably the most powerful constitutional check on 
the Executive”.
104
  Likewise, Matthew Palmer writes that:
105
 
  
New Zealand’s Constitution affords greater significance to key rules of the representative 
political process than any of the other of its constitutional rules, at least measured by the 
formal difficulty of changing them.   
 
The Electoral Act 1993 entrenches a number of provisions found in New Zealand’s 
constitutional statutes.
106
  Under section 268 of the Act,  seven provisions relating to the 
electoral cycle cannot be repealed or amended in the ordinary manner.
107
  These provisions 
must instead be repealed or amended only where the proposal “is passed by a majority of 75% 
of all the members of the House of Representatives” or “has been carried by  a majority of 
valid votes cast at a poll of the electors of the General and Māori electoral districts”.  The 
Electoral Commission’s recommendations would not alter any of the entrenched provisions, 
but are still important tweaks to the way that the electoral system operates.  It is problematic 
that such tweaks are determined by political considerations.  To some extent, the 1986 Report 
of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System acknowledged this importance of achieving 
electoral reform.  The Royal Commission highlighted that “the primary way in which the 
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people give their consent [to the exercise of public power by Parliament and Government] is 
through elections”.
108
 
 
The response to the 2012 recommendations of the Electoral Commission is not the only recent 
example of partisan considerations colouring the forming and reforming of electoral rules.  
The Electoral Finance Act 2007, introduced by the then Labour Government, was considered 
by many to be an example of electoral rules being reformed for partisan political gain.  The 
Act amended areas of electoral law to limit third parties’ abilities to advertise for political 
parties around elections and to campaign on political issues.
109
  Although the issues around 
third party advertising were legitimate non-partisan concerns, the actual legislation passed 
was largely seen as a knee jerk reaction to members of the Exclusive Brethren funding a 
significant ‘leaflet drop’ campaign against the Labour and Green Parties.
110
 It was designed 
and implemented urgently by the government, apparently to limit the ability of National Party 
supporters to undertake “parallel campaigning activity”.
111
   An Editorial in the New Zealand 
Herald strongly condemned the introduction of the law, asking readers, “When is the 
Government going to get this message: democracy is not a device to keep the Labour Party in 
power.”
112
  The proposed law was widely criticised - including by the Law Society and the 
Human Rights Commission - for “both of its substantive content and of the process by which 
it was conceived and enacted.”
113
 The law has since been repealed by the Electoral (Finance 
Reform and Advanced Voting) Amendment Act 2010, which replaced the rules around 
electoral advertising with rules that were passed with support from across the House of 
Representatives, without meaningful democratic participation in the decision.
114
  The passage 
of the Electoral Finance Act 2007 demonstrated the problem that arises when proposals for 
electoral reform are left in the hands of those who are elected by such rules.  Andrew Geddis 
wrote that “The normal parliamentary process for considering and enacting law misfired with 
regards to the Electoral Finance Act.”
115
  That process again misfired with the response to the 
Electoral Commission’s recommendations on MMP. 
 
E Finding a Solution? 
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 (a) Introducing ‘deliberative’ processes 
 
Constitutional theorists have suggested a range of different solutions to the problem posed by 
states that lack ‘democratic legitimacy’.  In addressing the shortcomings of representative 
democracy, an attractive proposition is to introduce ‘deliberative‘ elements to the 
constitutional framework.  ‘Deliberative Democracy‘ is    One example of such a solution is 
Ethan J. Leib’s suggestion that a ‘deliberative’ or ‘popular’ branch of Government - made up 
of “randomly selected civil juries” - be established to consider issues that are unsuitable for 
determination by elected lawmakers.
116
  This idea reflects developments in newly formed 
democracies, in which popular participation in constitution making has been a key focus.  In 
the specifically New Zealand context, Colon-Rios has suggested a mechanism be created 
known as the ‘Citizen Initiated Constituent Assembly’.
117
  That body would, in essence, allow 
citizens to propose constitutional change, which would be considered by a specially elected  
or randomly selected assembly of ordinary citizens to deliberate on the form of the 
proposal.
118
  The proposed change would then be put to popular vote in a binding referendum.  
Solutions such as the two outlined would certainly address the issues around political self 
interest acting as a barrier to constitutional change desired by the public. 
 
As suggested by Leib and Colon-Rios, a mechanism outside of ordinary representative 
government is desirable in certain situations - such as where self interest has essentially 
rendered the Electoral Commission’s review a ‘complete waste of time’.  In the specific 
context of New Zealand electoral laws, the scope of such a mechanism may be much 
narrower than the proposal of Colon-Rios, which would essentially overhaul the way in which 
the New Zealand constitution is shaped.  It would be possible to address the problematic 
nature of the lack of citizen engagement in ordinary mechanisms of electoral reform - the 
‘democratic deficit’ - without seriously undermining the power of the New Zealand 
Parliament to go about its business.   
 
In order to address the problem discussed, the mechanism must enable ‘the people’ of New 
Zealand to engage with issues of electoral reform, and to both initiate and participate in the 
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process of choosing the direction that the electoral system should take. As outlined by the 
1986 Royal Commission Report: 
119
 
 
The process of choice [of electoral processes] should to the fullest extent possible give 
each member of the community an equal part in the choice of the Government and a fair 
opportunity to participate in the process. 
 
(b) Citizens’ Assemblies on Electoral Reform 
 
It has been suggested by several leading constitutional lawyers that the way in which this 
could be achieved in New Zealand could be through the use of ‘citizens assemblies’ for 
electoral policy-making.
120
  Janine Hayward writes that “Citizens’ Assemblies have proven to 
be useful policy tools overseas in electoral reform”, and has suggested that such a tool would 
have been a preferable way of addressing concerns around New Zealand’s electoral processes 
than the 2011 referendum and subsequent review.
121
  The use of such assemblies is not 
entirely unprecedented in representative democracies.   
 
Citizens Assemblies on Electoral Reform have been engaged in Canada on two occasions - in 
British Columbia and Ontario.
122
  On each of these occasions, the Government established 
assemblies of citizens to consider whether improvements could be made to the current 
electoral system.
123
   In British Columbia in 2004, an assembly of 160 citizens was chosen 
almost at random to look at the electoral system, and to consider whether a new model would 
be preferable.
124
  Like in New Zealand, Canadian processes of electoral reform had, according 
to Warren and Pearse, been criticized “for being insufficiently inclusive, responsive, or 
deliberative ... so much that they produce results of questionable legitimacy.”
125
  The 
assembly thus gave the opportunity for citizens of British Columbia to to be engaged in the 
electoral reform process.  Jonathan Rose, the Chair of the Assembly engaged in Ontario, has 
supported the use of such assemblies on contentious issues.
126
  He wrote that “Assemblies are 
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ideal when politicians have a conflict of interest ... Since they have no agenda, their 
recommendations are viewed as sound ones by stakeholders, politicians and the public.”
127
 
 
The citizens’ assembly concept is by no means a perfect democratic institution.  The exercises 
in British Columbia and Ontario showed that the concept does have some inherent 
weaknesses.  Firstly, the randomly selected assemblies were diverse, but were not strictly 
representative, particularly as involvement was not mandatory, so individuals selected could 
refuse to participate.
128
  Secondly, the processes were resource intensive - requiring the 
investment of significant time, money and infrastructure in order to have any success.  This is 
particularly so in terms of the resources required to ensure that the members of the Assembly, 
ordinary citizens without any expertise in constitutional or electoral laws, would be fully 
engaged in the issues, some of which were quite complex.
129
  Finally, because the assembly 
concept required the assemblies’ proposals to be put to the public for approval, neither the 
British Columbian or Ontarian assemblies resulted in any change.  In British Columbia the 
recommended Single Transferable vote (STV) failed to reach 60 percent voter approval,
130
 
and in Ontario the proposal to adopt MMP was defeated by the status quo.
131
  The Canadian 
experiences, however, also showed that the concept is promising.
132
  The assemblies in 
Ontario and British Columbia demonstrated that “citizens have the capacity to shed their 
apathy, overcome their ignorance, and reason conscientiously about an unfamiliar and 
complex political issue.”
133
 Both of the assemblies had high levels of engagement among the 
participants, and - especially in the British Columbian case study - were viewed quite 
favourably by the wider public in terms of their legitimacy.
134
   In spite of its limitations the 
process would be preferable to the current system of leaving all electoral rule changes up to 
Members of Parliament.  
 
(c) Introducing a ‘citizen initiated’ mechanism 
 
The Citizens’ Assembly model itself addresses concerns about the lack of meaningful 
involvement of citizens in considering and implementing electoral rule changes.  In itself, 
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however, it does not address the problem that citizens also cannot initiate changes.  Drawing 
on the model proposed by Colon-Rios - which would allow citizens to initiate constitutional 
changes - the Citizens’ Assembly model could be similarly extended.  Under the extended 
model, a proposal for a Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform would be triggered either by 
a majority vote in the House of Representatives, or initiated by citizen(s) collecting a required 
number of signatures from registered electors, as is required by the Citizen Initiated 
Referenda process, which requires a petition be signed at least ten percent of registered 
electors.
135
 
 
While the Citizen Initiated Referenda - whereby a petition signed by ten percent of electors 
can force a non-binding referendum to be held on the petition question - is a widely criticized 
process,
136
 much of the criticism around a citizen initiated mechanism would not carry so 
much weight in terms of a ‘citizen initiated citizens’ assembly’ process.  In terms of its’ major 
weaknesses, Fenton and Geddis write that the process is marred by leading questions and poor 
drafting - the result of very few restrictions on the way the question must be framed.
137
  This 
undermines the usefulness of the exercise, because the results may not accurately reflect the 
gravity of the issue.  A citizens’ assembly would address concerns about questions, because 
the scope of an assembly is to deliberate on the issue at hand, rather than being limited to a 
yes or no question.  The nature of the assembly means that the referendum question that is 
produced is much more likely to be a neutral and well-reasoned question on technical changes 
to the operation of the electoral system, rather than an emotionally or morally charged 
question on policy.  Essentially, while “in general ... referendums are blunt and crude 
devices”
138
, the citizen initiated citizens’ assemblies would be much more targetted forms of 
democratic engagement. 
 
The other major concern around Citizen Initiated Referenda is the non-binding nature of the 
process.
139
  Even a decisive “yes” or “no” vote does not compel any legislative action, and so 
is often considered a waste of time.
140
  While a citizens’ assembly may also result in no 
legislative action, for example if the assembly was to recommend - after deliberating on the 
issue at hand - that no change be put to the public, or if - as occurred in British Columbia and 
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Ontario - the proposal of the assembly failed to gain sufficient support at the subsequent 
referendum, the result would be binding should a change be proposed that was carried at 
referendum.  Furthermore, learning from the experiences in other jurisdictions, constitutional 
lawyers have suggested that the assembly process could be tweaked in order to give the public 
more information on the assembly, thus improving its’ legitimacy - and the likelihood the 
public will support its deliberations.
141
  Fournier et al. suggest, for example, that the 
assemblies should have a more significant public profile, and “their members should be 
actively involved in the debate”, working “to educate the population about their reasoning and 
decisions”.
142
 
 
In their study of experiences with Citizens’ Assemblies in Canada and the Netherlands, 
Fournier et al emphasised that such assemblies “ought to be used sparingly under exceptional 
circumstances” - largely due to the resource intensive nature of such assemblies.
143
  They 
considered occasions where elected legislators failed to implement change that voters 
supported to be the “optimal circumstances for creating a citizens’ assembly.”
144
    The 
‘citizen initiated’ mechanism would allow the citizens’ assembly process to work as a 
backstop where the ordinary law making situation fails to produce a satisfactory result.  If, as 
with the Electoral Commission’s recommendations, a proposed change to electoral rules is 
either made or not made for what appears to be political reasons, there would be recourse for 
the voting public to force the issue to be considered in a non-partisan forum.  A ‘citizen 
initiated’ citizens’ assembly process for addressing questions of electoral rule changes would 
address many of the issues raised regarding partisan self interest and a lack of democratic 
involvement with the electoral rule making process. 
 
V Conclusion 
 
The 2012 Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP system 
recommended that several changes be made to the way in which future parliaments are 
elected in New Zealand.  Its foremost recommendations were to lower the five percent party 
vote threshold for entry into Parliament to four percent, and to abolish the one electorate seat 
exception to that rule.  While those changes would not fundamentally change the way in 
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which elections operate, they would certainly have some effect on the make up of future 
Parliaments and on voting behaviour in key electorates around the country. 
 
The lack of legislative response to the recommendations highlights an issue inherent in New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements.  The official response to the report was that no 
legislative action could be taken on the Electoral Commission’s recommendations because 
there was no consensus across the House of Representatives as to what changes should be 
adopted.  This response is almost entirely artificial, as there is little evidence that a consensus 
is required to make such a change and, furthermore, the nature of the topic for review 
virtually ensures that political parties will disagree.  The problem is thus: while electoral rules 
are fundamental to the legitimacy of the democratic process, the ‘unwritten’ constitution 
provides that electoral reforms (other than those entrenched in section 268 of the Electoral 
Act 1993) are entirely decided by the elected legislature.  This arrangement is problematic, 
because this leaves those who are elected by rules to decide what the rules should or should 
not be, and consequently gives rise to issues of partisan self interest.  Studies of electoral 
reform processes around the world have shown that due to self interest, political parties tend 
to support the process that is most likely to favour their chances in upcoming elections.  
Generally, with the exception of the New Zealand First Party’s position, this conclusion is 
mirrored in the positions of each New Zealand political party. 
 
This inherent issue in our constitutional arrangements is that there is a lack of democratic 
legitimacy - a democratic deficit - in terms of electoral reform processes.  Citizens are unable 
to initiate and participate in electoral rule changes, which are instead made through ordinary 
parliamentary processes, coloured by partisan self interest.    
 
The solution proposed in this paper, a ‘citizen initiated’ form of citizens assembly, draws on 
the ideas of various constitutional lawyers and theorists such as Joel Colon-Rios and Andrew 
Geddis, as well as the largely positive experience of citizens’ assemblies on electoral reform 
in Canada.  The process briefly outlined would address the issue of self interest colouring the 
electoral reform process, and give citizens a meaningful way to initiate and participate in 
important decisions relating to the democratic process where they see that the ordinary 
lawmaking process has failed to achieve a satisfactory result.
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